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GUARDIANSHIP OF SMITH
[42 C.2d 91; 265 P.2d 8881

[L. A. No. 22209.
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In Bank; Jan. 13, 1954.]

Guardianship of the Person and Estate of LELAND SMITH
et aL, Minors. FRIEDA HOWES, as Guardian etc.,
Respondent, v. HARRY COHEN, Appellant.
[1] Guardian and Ward---:Selection of Guardian-Appointment of
Parent Against Nonparent.-Where mother of illegitimate
minor children is dead and court found that both older daughter and natural father are "fit and proper" persons .to. be
guardians of the minors and have their custody and control,
but where it appears that additional consideration of factual
issues· is needed, an order appointing older daughter as
guardian of the persons of such minors on ground that it
would be to their "best interests and welfare" will be reversed
on father's appeal on judgment roll alone, thus setting at large
all issues of fact for redetermination by trial court.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County appointing guardian. Arnold Praeger,
Judge. Reversed.
Hahn, Ross & Saunders and Saul Rosf) for Appellant.
Clore Warne and.Maxwell E. Greenberg, as Amici Curiae
on behalf of Appellant.
Juaneita ..M. Veron for Respondent.
Oswald G. Ingold as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Respondent.
CARTER, J.-[1] Frieda Howes petitioned to be appoi!lted the guardian of the persons of Leland Smith, a minor
of8, and Sharon Smith, a minor of 6, brother and sister. She
alleged that she is the sister of the minors; their mother is
dead; their .father is Harry Cohen and aU reside in Los
Angeles, California; that the minors are now under her care
and she has supplied and cared for them since the death of
their mother; their.''natural" father, Cohen, has "remarried"
and has a family· of the second marriage; that the only relatives of the minors are their father, petitioner, and a brother,
[1] See Cal.Jur.,. Guardian and Ward, § 13; Am.Jur., Guardian
and Ward,§ 29.
McK. Dig. Reference: tl] Guardian and Ward,§ 13.
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have no
wJw
estate. Cohen filed
quested tllat he be
the illegitimate
"natural" father of
deceased, their
children of Cohen and
mother.
of both Frieda and
The court found all of the
Cohen are true; that both Frieda and Cohen are "fit and
proper" persons to be the
of the minors and have
their
and control; and that it is "to the best interest
and welfare'' of the minors that
be
guardian.
It was so ordered and Cohen
He asserts that being
the father of the
are illeg·itimate, he
has preference in the selection of their guardian, he being a fit
and proper person.
It is settled in this state that in either guardianship proceedings or
in a divorce action, the
parents of a
over a nonparent and the
shalt not be
to a nonparent unless the parent is found unfit. "'Where a parent applying for
custody is in a
to take the child and is not shown
to be unfit, the court may not award
to strangers
merely because it feels that
may be more fit & that they
may be more able to
educational, social, or
other benefits. . . . [
he discretionary power
of a trial court
those provisions of
of the Legislature regarding general
are set forth ( Civ. Code,
§§ 138, 197; Prob.
and by the judicial
interpretation of those
in relation to the
specific
the instant case.' (Robertson
v. Robertson, 72
132 [164 P.2d 52].) Section
1407 of the Probate
that as between persons
equally entitled in other
to the guardianship of a
minor preference is to be
first to a parent. This section
has been construed to be substantially the same as former
section 246 ( 3) of the Ci vii Code and section 1751 of the Code
of Civil Procedure which
in substance, that a parent
if competent is entitled to
in preference to any other
person. Section 138 of the Civil Code provides that as between parents
claiming the custody, neither parent
is entitled to it as of
but other things being equal, if
the child is of tender years it should be given to the mother;
if it is of an age to require education and preparation for
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labor and
then to the father. The code sections contemplate that the care of a minor child be awarded to a parent,
if a fit and proper person,
a stranger.'' (Stewart
v. Stewart, 41 Oal.2d
451
P . 2d 44] .)
Here the
Cohen, the father, was found fit rather
than unfit and the mother is dead. The
difference in
this case is that the minors vvere not the legitimate issue of
Cohen, but that is not
"'When the motber and father of an illegitimate child are
both alive and he has not been
the mother is
entitled to his
services and earnings to the exclusion
of the father.
Civ.
§ 200; In re
65 Cal.App.
617 [224 P. 784];
91 Cal.App.2d 336 [205
P.2d 48] ; 51 A.L.R. 1507.) Both tlw mother and the father
are responsible for his
( Civ.
§§ 196a, 196;
Schumm v.
37 Ca1.2d 174
P.2d 39, 21 A.L.R.2d
1051] ; Reed v.
23 Oal.2c1 336 [144 P.2d 561].)
On the death of the mother the natnral father is entitled to
the custody of an illegitimate child if he is a fit person. (See
Commonwealth v.
142 Pa.Super. 98 [15 A.2d 518] ;
Hayes v.
151 Va. 136
S.E. 432]; Aycock v.
liampton, 84 Miss. 204
So. 245, 105 Am.St.Rep. 424, 65
L.R.A. 689]; JJfon:tz v.
7 Watts (Pa.) 302 [32
Am.Dec. 762] ;
v.
272 App.Dlv. 79 [69 N.Y.S.
2d 462], afl'md. 297 N.Y.
N.E.2d 8] .) It has been
held repeatedly that, while the best interests of an illegitimate
child are the
the
of such a child have
a superior claim as
the world to his. custody if they
are fit and proper.
(Mo.App.) 292 S.W.
447, mother; Jensen
63 Utah 604 [228 P. 217],
mother; In re
~upra, 65
617, mother; Ex pade
Wallace, 26 N.1VL 181
, father; Garrett v.
JJ1ahaley, 199 Ala. 606
, father; Lewis v. Cro1J.!ell,
210 Ala. 199 [97 So.
v. 1Y1 eredith, s~tpra,
69 N.Y.S.2d
affmd.
N.E.2d 8] ; State
v. Nestaval, 72 Minn. 415
Jackson v. Luckie,
205 Ga. 100 [52 S.E.2d
Schwartzkopf, 149
Neb. 460 [31 N.W.2d
131 N.,J. 404
.2d 6301 ; French v.
Leagtte, 69
N.E.2d1
; Cmmnonwea!th ex rel.llttman
64
lL2d 447] ; Templeton v.
) 179 S.W.2d 811; Henderson v. Henderson, 187 Va. J21 [46 S.E.2d 101; Petition of DickhoUz,

r

1
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341 Ill.App. 400 [94 N.E.2d 89]; 7 Am .•Jur., Bastards, §§ 6166; 10 C.J.S., Bastards, § 17; 51 A.L.R. 1507.)
There is an additional factor iu the instant case. As far
as appears the minors have not been legitimated. By awarding their custody to the father they are more likely to be
legitimated because ''The father of an illegitimate child, by
publicly acknowledging it as his own, receiving it as such,
with the consent of his wife, if he is married, into his family,
and otherwise treating it as if it were a legitimate child,
thereby adopts it as such; and such child is thereupon deemed
for all purposes legitimate from the time of its birth." ( Civ.
Code, § 230.) Unless the father has the right to custody it is
not probable that he will receive the minors into his home and
thus legitimate them.
This being a judgment roll appeal and the ground of reversal being that the order appealed from is not supported
by the findings, the question is presented as to whether there
should be a general reversal or a reversal with direction to
the trial court to enter an order appointing appellant guardian
of the persons of the minors here involved. Section 53 of the
Code of Civil Procedure provides in part : ''The Supreme
Court, and the District Courts of Appeal, may affirm, reverse,
or modify any judgment or order appealed from, and may
direct the proper judgment or order, or direct a new trial
or further proceedings to be had.'' A proper construction of
the foregoing provision would seem to be that in a case such
as this, this court may, in its discretion, order a general reversal which means that the case is set at large and the issues
of fact must be retried, or may direct the trial court to enter
an order appointing appellant guardian of the minors in the
place of respondent in accordance with the views herein expressed. In view of our conclusion that the trial court may
desire to give further consideration to the factual matters
presented, we deem it appropriate to order a general reversal
of the order, thus setting at large all of the issues of fact
for a redetermination by the trial court.
The order is reversed.
Shenk, J., and Spence, J., concurred.
TRAYNOR, J.-I concur in the judgment.
The objection to the rule that custody must be awarded
to the parent unless he is unfit carries the harsh implication
that the interests of the child are subordinated to those of
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the parent when the trial court has found that the best interests of the child would be served by giving his custody to
another. 'l'he heart of the problem, however, is how the
best interests of the child are to be served. Is the trial
court more sensitive than the parent to what the child's best
interests are, better qualified to determine how they are to
be served~ It would seem inherent in the very concept of a
fit parent that such a parent would be at least as responsive
as the trial court, and very probably more so, to the best
interests of the child. The rule requiring that custody be
awarded to such a parent in preference to a stranger does not
operate to subordinate the interests of the child to those of
the parent; it merely serves to define the area of the parent's
responsibility for the welfare of the child. The court's
statutory duty to be ''guided by what appears to be for the
best interests of the child in respect to its temporal and
mental and moral welfare" (Prob. Code, § 1406) encompasses
the view that the child's welfare is part of the responsibility
of a fit parent.
One gains perspective by recalling that families are ordinarily allowed to function without outside interference though
their wisdom in the upbringing of children may vary as
widely as the physical heritage or economic advantages they
give their children. Unless the upbringing of the child is so
defective as to call for action by the juvenile court, it is unlikely that an outsider will challenge the parental custody
or seek by legal process to prove that the child's welfare
would best be served elsewhere. It is generally understood
that the stability of established family units would be jeopardized by outside interference.
It is only when the family is dissolved by death, divorce
or separation that conflicting claims to custody are likely to
arise. If the parents are divorced and no third parties are
involved, the court of necessity arbitrates whatever conflicting
claims the parents may have to the custody of the children.
If one parent dies, however, or upon divorce is unable or unfit
to have custody of a child, outsiders may enter the picture
and attack the competence of the other parent to have custody or contend that the child would be better off with them.
'l'he problem may also arise if the parent awarded custody
at the time of divorce dies or for other reasons is no longer
able to care for the child, or if one or both parents have
through necessity been unable for a time to care for the child
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from outbut
siders whose ac:sistanee
interim.
Ordinarily in any of these circumstances the determination
of what course will best serve the interests of the child will
involve the consideration of numerous imponderables. All
things
equal, it is clear that the parent should have
custody. All things are
not
however. The
outsider may be able to offer the child
material advantages. In the case of the death of the parent having
custody after
the child may be on more intimate terms
with relatives or a new spouse of the deceased parent than
vvith the other parent who has not had custody. If the child
has not been in the custody of either
he may have been
into the home of the person who has
successfully
been
for him. The
custody may have
remarried so that if
is awarded to him, the child will
be faced with the problem of
to a stepparent. On
the other hand, the
the relationship
between a natural
child cannot be gainsaid.
Even in a case where the foster
treats the child as his
own, the child may still suffer from the lack of a natural
parent in the eyes of his
or natural children or
other relatives of his foster parent may discriminate against
him. If he gets into
members of his foster family
may be tempted to
out that he is not really one of them.
Moreover, even if the child is
to make some sacrifice
to a new environment,
to be with his natural parent or
it does not necessarily follow that his welfare will be correspondingly impaired. It may not be to the best interest of
the child to have every advantage. He may derive benefits by
subordinating his immediate interests to the development of
a ne1v family
with his own parent, by giving as
well as receiving.
although a change in custody from
an outsider to a
may involve the disruption of a satisfactory status quo, it may lead to a more desirable relationship
in the long run.
The facts of the
case aptly illustrate the problem.
'fhe two children lived with their mother and half sister
until their mother's death. At that time they were 8 and
6 years of age. 'l'heir home was disrupted
their mother's
death, and both their half sister and their father now seek
their custody. The trial court has found that both are fit
and proper persons. It may be assumed that the children
wish to stay with their sister and that their lives will be
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Jess disrupted at this time if they are allowed to remain with
tl1c relative they know best. On the other hand, unless ensis given to their father they will remain to all intents and
purposes orphans. If their friends inquire about their father
they will either have to fabricate a story or admit their
illegitimacy. If their sister marries, her husband might be
unwilling to have them in his home. If the children are
awarded to their father, they will become legitimate. ( Civ.
§ 230.) They will be placed in a normal home environment with one natural parent and will suffer social
embarrassment only to the extent that their past may become
known to their friends. In all likelihood the care and support
they will receive from their father will be greater if they move
into his home than if they remain essentially strangers to him.
There are thus many considerations that support the conclusion that their best interests would be served by awarding
custody to their father. There are also considerations that
support the contrary conclusion of the trial court.
Psychology is not an exact science. If expert testimony
were introduced in eases such as this in all probability it
would be in conflict. 'rhe ordinary judge as well as the
ordinary parent lacks the omniscience aecurately to evaluate
all of the various considerations that may enter into a custody
problem. '' 'rhe essenee of custody is the companionship of
the child and the right to make decisions regarding his care
and control, education, health, and religion." (Lerner v.
811.perior Cmlrt, 38 Cal.2d 676, 681 [242 P.2d 321].) If a
parent is tit he will be vitally eoncerned with the best interests
of his child. By leaving to him the responsibility as to how
those interests will be best served the court simply recognizes
that "It is cardinal with us that the eustody, eare and nurture
of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function
and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can
neither supply nor hinder. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, supra,
[268 U.S. 510, 45 S.Ct. 571, 69 L.Ed. 1070, 39 A.L.R. 468].
And it is in recognition of this that these decisions have
respected the private realm of family life which the state
cannot enter." (Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166
[64 S.Ct. 438, 88 hE(L 645].)
Cases may arise in whieh the child's interests would be
seriously prejudiced by awarding custody to his parent. In
such cases, however, the parent's insistence on his right to
custody despite the harm that would clearly result to his
42 C.2d-4
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child will itself be evidence of his unfitness. (In re Bensfield,
102 Cal.App. 445, 449 [283 P. 112]; Guardianship of Casacl,
106 Cal.Appo2d 134, 152 [234 Po2d 647] .)
In the present case the appeal is upon the judgment roll
alone, and for the purposes of this decision we must accept
the finding of the trial court that the father is a fit and
proper person to be appointed guardian of the children. It
bears emphasis, however, that the father of an illegitimate
child comes before the court in at best a questionable light.
Although past indiscretions do not necessarily demonstrate
present unfitness (P1·onty v. Pronty, 16 Cal.2d 190, 193-19L1
[105 P.2d 295] ; In re Green, 192 Cal. 714, 721 [221 P. 903] ;
see, also, Clarke v. Clarke, 35 Cal.2d 259, 261-262 [217 P.2d
401]), such a father should be required to explain why he has
not legitimated his child. A father who has the power to do
so but does not, demonstrates his unfitness by his willingness
to inflict upon his child the status of illegitimacy. Such a
father must not be allowed to bargain with the court by
offering to exercise his power to legitimate in exchange for
custody. On the other hand, a desire to secure custody may
be the outgrowth of a moral rehabilitation reflected in an
effort to undo a past wrong by legitimating the child.
A father may legitimate his child by marrying the mother
(Civ. Code, § 215) or "by publicly acknowledging it as his
own, receiving it as such, with the consent of his wife, if he
is married, into his family, and otherwise treating it as if
it were a legitimate child." ( Civ. Code, § 230.) On the record
before us we must assume that the father did not legitimate
his children because he was unable to do so. At the present
time the father is married. To legitimate the children now
he must have the consent of his wife to receive the children
into his family. ( Civ. Code, § 230.) There is no express
finding that his wife is willing to receive the children into
the family. On retrial the father must establish that the
children will be legitimated as a minimum prerequisite to
establishing his fitness for appointment as guardian.
SCHAUER, J.-1 dissent.
'l'his is a judgment roll appeal. The facts are not in dispute.
The trial court found ''That both petitioner FRIEDA HowEs
and counter petitioner HARRY CoHEN are fit and proper persons to be the guardian of the minors herein, and to have
their . . . custody .
That it is to the best interest and
welfare of said minor children that FRIEDA HowEs be ap0

0

Jan. 1954]

GUARDIANSHIP OF SMITH
[42 C.2d 91; 265 P.2d 888]

99

pointed guardian of their persons . . . '' The court also :found
that the mother of said children is deceased and that "Petitioner [adult sister of the minors] has supported and cared
for said minors since the death of the mother" and that appellant is the natural father of the children and "is remarried and has a family of the second marriage.'' Letters of
guardianship ·were ordered issued to Frieda Howes.
Appellant's sole ground for reversal is that on the findings,
he, as the children's natural father who is not found "unfit,"
is as a matter of law entitled to judgment denying the petition of the children's sister and ordering the issuance of
letters of guardianship to him. He argues, incidentally, that
the finding ''That it is to the best interest and welfare of
said minor children that FRIEDA HowEs be appointed guardian'' is immaterial, and must be disregarded. The majority
opinion sustains appellant's position in its entirety except
that, even though this is a judgment roll appeal, it states
that a reexamination of the evidence shall be had.
Appellant does not aver that he desires custody and control
of the children. He did not initiate proceedings seeking to
be appointed guardian of these children and he does not allege
that he ever has had them in his custody, or heretofore sought
their custody, or that he ever has supported them. He
appears only in response to the petition of Frieda and has
contented himsel:f' with filing a document entitled '' OBJECTIONS To APPOINTl\fENT OF GuARDIAN AND CouNTER-PETITION
FOR APPOINTMEN'r OF GUARDIAN" wherein he merely "objects
to the appointment of said FRIEDA HowEs as the Guardian
of said children and desires that if it is deerned by the Court
necessaTy that a Guardian be appointed, that he be appointed
Guardian of said children." (Italics added.) It is also noted
that in Frieda's petition for appointment as guardian the
word ''illegitimate'' does not appear; the name of the mother
does not appear; the fact of nonmarriage is not alleged; the
pertinent and sufficient averments in respect to the mother
are the simple words "Mother deceased." How different are
appellant's sensibilities! In his objections to Frieda's appointment he bluntly avers ''That said minor children are the
illegitimate children of petitioner and their mother, MARGUERITE SMITH, now deceased.''
How eloquently it thus appears on the face of the judgment roll that even though appellant has not been adjudicated "unfit," and has rather been decreed legally "fit,"
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whatever that may mean, he continues now to be as indifferent
to the welfare of the children as, from the fact that they
were born out of wedlock and that he does not claim to have
ever had their custody, 1 it could be inferred he has been
from the beginning. Could it be that the real ground for
appellant's objections to having the children's adult sister
appointed their guardian is a fear that in the interests of
these minors she might seek to compel this man to contribute
suitably to their support~
And there is still further affirmative evidence in this record,
mere judgment roll though it be, of appellant's lack of concern for these children. Appellant asserts in his brief (and
respondent concurs in this statem.ent) that the hearing on the
guardianship matter "was extremely brief and was based
principally upon the report of the Probation Officer and
upon an interview in Chambers between the trial judge and
the two minor children.'' The substance of the interview
is not shown in the record and the preference expressed by
the children does not specifically appear, but appellant urges
that such preference "is immaterial." (Italics added.) Can
we doubt what that preference is?
Appellant argues further that "it is still the law of this
State that a parent has a superior right to the custody of
his minor children, provided only he is fit and proper to have
such custody and regardless of whether or not it would be
better for stteh children to be with a stranger." (Italics
added.) Therefore, concludes appellant, the trial court ''in
awarding the guardianship of the children ... to a stranger
[their sister or half sister who was caring for and supporting
them] against the wishes of the father who was a fit and
proper person to have their custody, abused its discretion."
It seems to me that on this record it is this court which abuses
its discretion in reversing the order of the trial court.
Let us look further at this record. Nowhere therein nor in
his briefs does appellant come forth with a clear and un1 So far as the record on appeal shows appellant does not claim to
have supported the children or even to have made any contribution toward
their support. However, on the oral argument (at the first hearing)
before us, one of the justices, going outside the recOTd, asked counsel for
appellant '' Diil he ever support the children~'', and counsel replied
"Yes." 'rhe inqt1iring justice also asked counsel for the respondent the
question ''The father dld support these ehildren f '' and counsel responded ''The father contributed somewhat to their support, yes.''
There was no stipulation that the record should be augmented by adding
all or any part of the quoted questions and unsworn answers, or that
any of such "evidence" was before the trial court.
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equivocal declaration that he is willing to support his children, that he desires their personal custody, that he loves
them and that he wants to best serve their welfare, and on
that account wants to be their guardian; likewise he does
not even state 2 that he wishes to receive them into his family
and otherwise treat them as if they were legitimate, either
in order that they may thereby become legitimated as provided by the Civil Code ( § 230), or in order to see to it
that their best interest and welfare are subserved in other
respects as well. Rather, the whole tenor of appellant's
pleadings, briefs, and arguments indicates that he is stepping
carefully around an assertion that he now wishes to assume
full responsibility for the children, instead suggests that his
chief interest is that no one else be placed in a position to
assert rights of the children as against him, and that any
authority he may have over the children not be lost, as would
result from the appointment of another as their guardian
( Civ. Code, § 204, subd. 1.) The entire record tends to
confirm the conclusional finding of the trial court that the
best interest and welfare of the children lie with their sister,
respondent herein, rather than with appellant; nevertheless,
the majority of this court, even on this judgment roll appeal,
impliedly question the sufficiency of the evidence to support
such finding, and argue that certain elements of assumed
evidence and implications of some of the findings tend to
support a contrary finding that the interests of the children
would be better served by placing them in the custody of
the father.
'rhis case appears to me to again illustrate the poignant
undesirability, which I pointed out in my dissents in Roche
v. Roche (1944), 25 Cal.2d 141, 144-149 [152 P.2d 999];
Stewart v. Stewart (1953), 41 Cal.2d 447 [260 P.2d 44] ;
2Subsequent to the filing of this court's opinion when this cause was
first befo1e it, and while respondent's petition for rehearing was pending,
counsel for appellant addressed a letter to the court in which it is stated,
among other things, that "It is very clear to appellant that the judgment
of the trial court was reversed and that as a result thereof, no further
hearing is neeessary . . .
"Counsel for appellant is able to give this Court positive assuranee
that immediately upon receipt of these children into the home of appellant, these children will be legitimatized . . .
''Requiring legitimation as a pre-requisite to awarding guardianship
is to put the cart before the horse . . . ''
It should be obvious that the letter from counsel was not before the
trial court, is not in the record, is not signed by or binding on appellant,
and cannot properly affect the disposition of a judgment roll appeal.
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and Guardianship of Kentera (1953), 41 Cal.2d 639, 645
[262 P.2d 317], of requiring the trial court to find a parent
to be "unfit" before it can confide the custody of a child to
another person, even when the child's best interests are found
to be with others. Who can say what "fit" or "unfit" may
mean to different judges? If the term be cheapened to mean
less fit by comparison-and there are those who argue that
such interpretation should be given to it-then the finding
that the best interests of the children require that they be
placed with one person rather than with another is in effect
a finding that, by comparison, the latter is unfit. But why
should these children, already bearing the burden of having
illegitimate parents (which, as noted hereinabove, their father
in this record has unnecessarily alleged and has evidenced
no concern about removing) be further burdened with a finding that their natural father is "unfit" to be their guardian?
The statute does not require it. The children are both less
than 10 years of age and it may well be that at some future
time changed circumstances and changed attitudes of the
father, and perhaps the wishes of the children themselves,
will indicate that it would thereafter serve their best interest
and welfare to be with the father.
As declared in the dissent in the Roche case, it is my view
that we should have confidence in trial judges and in the processes of the law which enable them to view and hear at
first hand the children, the parents and other claimants, and
that their discretion in the premises should not be so rigidly
limited as is done by the rule followed by the majority here.
To require a trial court to find a parent "unfit" in order that
it may accord the children their right to have their best
interest and welfare promoted appears to me to be harsh,
legalistic, unfair to both the children and the parent, and in
contravention of the legislative intent.
Regardless of differences of opinion as to the desirability
of the rule as applied in the Roche case it is quite unnecessary
to apply it here. For this holding today there is neither
statute nor precedent requiring or supporting it. The holdings of In re Campbell (1900), 130 Cal. 380 [62 P. 613],
and In re Mathews (1917), 174 Cal. 679 [164 P. 8] (see, also,
Estate of Wise (1918), 179 Cal. 423, 426 [177 P. 277]; In re
Green (1923), 192 Cal. 714, 721 [221 P. 903]) that a parent
of a minor child under 14 years of age, if found by the court
to be ''competent to discharge the duties of guardianship''
was entitled to be appointed guardian in preference to a non-
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parent, regardless of the best interest of the child, are both
based upon the specific language of the first sentence of former
section 1751 of the Code of Civil Procedure. That sentence
was, however, repealed in 1931, and not reenacted, although
the other provisions of the section were reenacted as sections
1406 and 1410 of the Probate Code. It thus appears that
the Legislature, in recognition of what seems to me to be the
protest expressed by this court in In re Mathews, supra, and
Estate of Wise, supra, against statutes construed to require
that the property right of a parent in a child be considered
superior to the best interest and welfare of the child, wisely
decided to, and did, remove such requirement from the law
of this state.
In the :Mathews case, decided in 1917, the court pointed out
(p. 683 of 174 Cal.), that "It is argued with great force that
the trend of modern decisions is to regard as of primary importance the welfare of the minor himself. This is most true.
The decisions to this effect are made either under the permission of the law, which contains no such restriction as that
found [in 1917] in our section 1751, or else are given under
the command of the law which, in effect, declares that over
and above all else the controlling consideration shall be the
welfare of the child. If we were thus at liberty to act, it
might well be that the custody of this child, under the findings
of the court, would be given to [the non parent with whom the
child had been living for some 10 years] . . . ''
It is therefore my view that the courts of this state are
no longer required by statute to arbitrarily disregard the welfare of the child whenever a legally "fit" parent is making
claim, and need no longer adhere to the view expressed in
In re Ca~npbell (1900), sup1·a, 130 Cal. 380, 382, that the
right of the parent in the child is similar to that of the owner
of property in his chattel and must ''be regarded as coming
within the reason, if not within the strict letter, of the constitutional provisions for the protection of property . . . "
To place this property right conception of a parent's claim
to children over and above the welfare of the children seems
to me to be a throwback of generations if not of centuries.
The mandate of our r~egislature as expressed in section 1406
of the Probate Code is that "In appointing a general guardian
of a minor, the court is to be guided by what appears to be
for the best interest of the child in respect to its temporal
and mental and moral welfare; and if the child is of sufficient
age to form an intelligent preferenee, the court may consider
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that preference in determining the question
'' These
provisions, when construed with the provision of section 1407
of the same code, that ''Of persons equally entitled in other
respects to the guardianship of a minor, preference is to be
given as follows : ( 1) To a parent; . . . '' (italics added),
appear to me to require that the first concern of the court
should be directed toward determining "what appears to be
for the best interest of the child in respect to its temporal
and mental ancl moral ·welfare" (italics added) as specified by
section 1406, and that only when the sum of all of these
aspects of the child's \Velfare will be subserved equally well
by having the parent as guardian will the parent's right be
held as a matter of law superior.
I am further of the view that such a philosophy, rather
than tending toward the weakening of family relationships
and the assumption of arbitrary state control over children,
will work towards the contrary result. "Where, as here, although the parent is found legally "fit," it does not appear
that as between parent and child there ever has been a family
relationship, and where the parent's concern for his children's
welfare and his wish to serve their best interests are unestablished and appear to be highly questionable, how can it
be considered that any family relationship that might be
established with him would be more desirable than that heretofore and presently enjoyed by the children with their sister,
respondent herein who, it seems, has cared for them as a labor
of love? Is it not more likely that they will grow to mature,
responsible adulthood, to take a useful place in society, when
living in the home in which the trial court found their best
interest resides, rather than being compelled to leave that home
for such abode, if any, as the father may be inclined to
designate? Although I believe there is no question but that
in the vast majority of cases the best interest of the child will
lie with the natural parent and that trial judges surely can
be depended on to so find, it nevertheless seems to me that
this case points up and again emphasizes the necessity, the
justice, and the rightness, of permitting trial judges the
exercise of a wise discretion in deciding problems of custody
and guardianship of children. 'l'here are many things in this
record which, in the interests of the children, seem to cry
aloud for support of the trial court's order, yet none of those
things suggests that the trial judge should have found the
father to be "unfit" to have custody of children. Indeed
it would have been a cruel and unnecessary act for the trial
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v,ourt to have found the father "unfit" to have custody of
ehildren, for there is another finding in the record. It is
that this "Natural father is remarried and has a family of
the second marriage.'' To this second family appellant well
may be not only a legitimate husband and father but in
truth a "natural" and a kindly, considerate one. Yet however fit he is in a legalistic sense, he may be the last one
who, for the interests of the children, should be appointed
their guardian.
The findings establish that the children have no estate.
Such findings also establisl1, directly or impliedly, that the
appellant is the one person who is primarily liable for the
support of the chiLdren and against whom the guardian
should assert rights on behalf of the children. But this court
holds that as a matter of law, since appellant is not legally
"unfit," the welfare of the children cannot even be considered, let alone given effect.
Although I have not discussed the question of illegitimacy
as bearing upon any right of the father (except as it may be
relevant before the trial court in determining what is for
their best interest), it may be noted that while under the
provisions of section 1403 of the Probate Code the consent of
both parents, if living and capable of consent, is required
for the appointment by will or deed of a guardian of a child,
nevertheless the mother alone may make such appointment if
the t:Ohild is illegitimate. Also, section 1405 of the same code
provides that the court may appoint a guardian "when no
guardian has been appointed . . . by will or by deed . . . "
'l'hese sections would appear to me to cast further doubt upon
the absolute legal right here sought to be asserted by appellant-father. (See In re Britt (1917), 176 Cal. 177 [167 P.
863]; In re Imperatrice (1920), 182 Cal. 355, 358 [188 P. 45] .)
As already indicated there are some assumptions in the
majority opinion, and some in the concurring opinion, which
appear to be inconsistent with the trial court's findings, and
to be indulged to the end of supporting a reversal rather
than an affirmance. The majority and concurring opinions
speak of a new trial. But this is a mere judgment roll appeal,
and the reversal must be based on the findings or it is necessarily in defiance of the strict direction of section 4% of article
VI of the Constitution. Thus, as pointed out by counsel for
appellant, there is no occasion for a new trial. On the
majority holding appellant is, as a matter of law, entitled to
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guardianship papers, yet both the majority and concurring
opinions suggest a new trial.
The majority say ''There is an additional factor in the instant case. As far as appears the minors have not been
legitimated. By awarding their custody to the father they
are more likely to be legitimated . . . Unless the father has
the right to custody it is not probable that he will receive
the minors into his home and thus legitimate them.'' This
speculation as to the existence or nonexistence of facts and
as to possible future events, and as to the effect thereof on
the weight or sufficiency of the evidence supporting the finding that it is to the best interest of the children that letters
of guardianship issue to, and that they remain in the custody
of, the respondent adult sister who has supported and cared
for them since the death of their mother several years ago,
has no legitimate place in an opinion disposing of a judgment
roll appeal.
It cannot lawfully be assumed that on a new trial there
can be any evidence which would justify not awarding the
children's guardianship to the father, because, on evidence
which cannot be doubted, he has already been found to be
fit and that finding, as a matter of law, it is held, entitles
him to a reversal of the judgment. If on this record he is
entitled to a reversal, a fortiori he is entitled to letters of
guardianship without further hearing. This has to be true,
because otherwise the majority would be reversing a judgment without a showing of prejudice as required by section
4% of article VI of the California Constitution and by section 475 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The burden is on
appellant to show prejudice, i.e., a miscarriage of justice.
On this judgment roll appeal he cannot possibly show prejudice entitling him to a reversal unless on that record (upon
the findings) he is entitled to judgment in his favor, which
means the issuance of letters of guardianship on the going
down of the remittitur. Therefore, this court, if it upholds
the law, must sustain the award of letters of guardianship
to appellant upon the going down of the remittitur without
further hearing in the trial court. But evidencing at last
some slight weakening in its self-made rule of thumb for
award of custody it suggests that there should be a new trial.
Also demanding mention, to avoid possible confusioi1, is
the concurring opinion's statement (not concurred in by the
majority) that ''On retrial the father must establish that
the children will be legitimated as a minimum prerequisite
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to establishing his fitness for appointment as guardian." This
statement has no legitimate place in the opinion. As already
mentioned repeatedly this is a judgment roll appeal. The
evidence is not before us ; it is conclusively presumed to be
sufficient to support all findings and the findings squarely
determine that the appellant is a fit person to be appointed
guardian of the children here concerned. But if there is to
be a new trial it is to be hoped that the quoted statement
will not be accepted by the trial court. To accept it might
well work a manifest injustice to the appellant father, and to
his wife, and occasion unnecessary suffering both to these
children and to the presently legitimate children of appellant
and his wife. It may be, or it may not be, to the best interests
of the children involved here that they be taken into the home
and family of appellant. There might develop a quite natural
resentment on the part of the legitimate children of the
established family to what they could consider to be an intrusion. Their remarks to neighborhood children could lead
to cruelties and griefs which only the sensitive can fully
understand and which only the callous would willfully inflict.
'rhere can be far more sinister influences on the life of a child
than the legal status of illegitimacy. If the appellant here
has all the virtues which the concurring opinion assumes for
him, then his good faith determination that the welfare of
these children will best be served by not taking them into
his household should be respected just as much as his possible
determination to the contrary. In any event it is to me unthinkable that a trial court should find the appellant father
here, if he is a good husband and father to his present family,
to be "unfit" to have the custody of the children whose welfare is here at stake.
The extraordinary concept of "fitness" disclosed in the
eoncurring opinion does not appear to, at least at this time,
have the concurrence of any other justice of this court and is
not, I think, likely to commend itself to many trial judges
whose duty it is to deal face to face with live children and
flesh and blood parents and custodians. Judges who handle
such cases have, in my observation of their work, exhibited a
high respect for the law, a conscientious fidelity to duty, and
great wisdom and patience in seeking to determine the course
that will best serve the interests of the children. Such judges,
I think, are regretful that we arbitrarily deny to them the
right to ron~ider the welfare of the children as opposed to a
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custody claim of a parent unless the parent be found "unfit."
The trial judge, when he is confronted with facts which indicate that for a while the interests of a child imperatively
demand placement with a person other than a parent, ordinarily uses that means to bridge the present emergency, and
he looks to the future and possible restoration of the child to
the custody of a parent (or parents) at a later date. The
law, as enacted by the Legislature, contemplates such procedure and every custody order is subject to modification
during the child's minority. A judge so engaged realizes
that few domestic relations concepts could be more cruel in
application and regrettable in result than a willingness to
lightly-but necessarily publicly and indelibly-brand a
parent as "unfit." Such branding would almost certainly
mean that the parent could never hope to regain either the
custody or respect or affection of his child; no more could
the child hope to rejoin his parent. Such a branding could
add immeasurably to the burdens and handicaps of the children affected. And it would do all this without any necessity
therefor, simply to satisfy a court-made rule which is adhered
to in direct derogation of the legislative policy.
It should further be pointed out that the concurring opinion,
after at least suggesting lip service to the view that it would
be harsh to place the rights of a ''fit'' parent above the best
interests of the child, then goes on to assert that '"l'he heart
of the problem, however, is how the best interests of the child
are to be served. Is the trial court more sensitive than the
parent to what the child's best interests are, better qualified
to determine how they are to be served f It would seem
inherent in the very concept of a fit parent that such a parent
would be at least as responsive as the trial court, and very
probably more so, to the best interests of the child." Such an
assertion completely ignores the obvious fact that it is in
controversies in which the parent's responsiveness to the best
interests of the child has been called into question, that trial
courts are called upon to determine where such interests lie,
and that in such controversies our Constitution and the Legislature have entrusted to trial courts exercising a proper discretion, rather than to either parents or appellate courts,
the determination of the issue. I do not share at all the indicated deprecatory view of the wisdom of trial judges and
I would leave with them, appreciatively, the full scope of discretion given them by the Legislature in the handling of the
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very difficult and dclieate problems which daily confront them
in domestic relations court.
I would affirm the order appealed from.
EDMONDS, J.-In a proceeding to appoint a guardian for
a minor child, the court must be g·uided ''by what appears to
be the best interest of the child in respect to its temporal
and mental and moral welfare." (Prob. Code,§ 1406.) The
code provisions relating to the custody of a legitimate minor
child, as construed in Roche v. Roche, 25 Cal.2d 141 [152
P.2d 999], Stewart v. Stewart, 41 Cal.2d 447 [260 P.2d 44),
and Gttardianship of Kentera, 41 Cal.2d 639 [262 P.2d
317], are a legislative determination that the child's interest
will be best served if the right of the natural parent to his
custody is made paramount to that of a stranger. In this
connection, section 197 of the Civil Code specifically provides
that "[i}f either the father or mother [of a legitimate unmarried minor child} be dead or unable or refuse to take
the custody or has abandoned his or her family, the other
is entitled to its custody, services and earnings."
There is no similar provision in regard to an illegitimate
child. Section 200 of the Civil Code, which concerns the
custody of such a child, gives that right to the mother without
mention of the father's status upon her death. In short,
there is no legislative determination that, when the mother
is dead, the interest of the child will be better served by a
custodial right in the father superior to that of any other
person.
The conclusion reached in the majority and concurring
opinions is based upon the rule which governs judicial determination of the custody of legitimate children. But there
is far less reason to suppose that the generally undesired
child of an illicit relationship will enjoy the same paternal
love and affection as that of a legitimate one.
Great concern is expressed by my associates in regard to
the probability of legitimating the child. According to
Justice Carter, the child more likely will be legitimated if
the father is given a paramount right to his custody. Justice
Traynor takes the position that a willingness to legitimate the
child is a minimum prerequisite to a showing of the father's
fitness.
The probability of legitimation is a consideration which
cannot be too strongly emphasized. But in my opinion, there
is no reasonable basis for concluding that a father will be
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more moved to do what is right if he is given a paramount
right to custody. To permit the trial judge to ascertain
first that the child will be legitimated before awarding custody to the father and, in the absence of such action, to award
custody to another qualified person would more nearly achieve
that objective. Otherwise the trial judge must award custody
to the father without assurance that the child will be legitimated or, according to the alternative suggestion, may declare
the father unfit if legitimation is not accomplished, despite
the fact that the only hindrance may be the failure of his
wife to consent.
The trial court found that the best interests of the children
will be served by giving their custody to Frieda Howes. The
appeal being on the judgment roll, it must be presumed
that the evidence supports that determination. If upon a
future application it should be shown that the children's
interests would be better served because of a change in conditions of which legitimation of the children may be one, a
different order may be made. But upon the present record,
I would affirm the order of the trial court.
Gibson, C. J., concurred.

[L. A. No. 22321.

In Bank.

Jan. 22, 1954.]

THE CITY OF SAN DIEGO, Plaintiff and Appellant, v.
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA TELEPHONE CORPORATION (a Corporation), Defendant and Appellant.
[1] Telegraphs and Telephones-Franchises-Privileges Granted
by State-Acceptance.-By 1905 amendment of Civ. Code,
§ 536 (now Pub. U til. Code, § 7901), the state offers to telephone corporations a franchise to construct lines along or
on any public road or highway, and franchise is accepted when
such a corporation constructs its lines on public road or highway and maintains and operates a telephone system.
[1] See Cal.Jur., Telegraphs and Telephones, § 7; Am.Jur., Telegraphs and Telephones, § 28.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Telegraphs and Telephones, § 10;
[2, 7, 8] Telegraphs and Telephones, § 11; [3, 4, 9-13] Telegraphs
and Telephones, § 12; [5] Appeal and Error, § 1346; [6] Injunctions, § 109 (5).

